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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GRAYBAR ELECTRIC, INC, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES LEWIS dba LEWIS ELECTRIC, 
Defendant/Appellant• 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal by the Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter 
defendant) to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Article VIII, 
Section 3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and Section 78-
2-2, Utah Code Annotated from the Judgment rendered by the 
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor of the Second Judicial District Court 
in and for Weber County, State of Utah Civil No. 890903456. The 
Utah Supreme Court referred the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(j), Utah Code Annotated. 
References to pleadings in the record are given by the 
pleading title. No record numbers are given only transcript pages. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the judgment rendered by the Honorable Stanton M. 
Taylor after trial in this matter was erroneous, specifically: 
Brief of Respondent 
Case No. 900466-CA 
a. Whether there was a contract between the parties; 
b. If there was no contract between the parties could 
the plaintiff/respondent (hereinafter plaintiff) be held 
responsible to the defendant for damages and/or loss profits 
under a theory of promissory estoppel; and 
c. Did defendant carry his burden of proof with respect 
to damages and/or loss profits at the trial level in order to 
recover any damages. 
d. Are the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law found 
and determined by the trial Court correct. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of the appellate court relating to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (appendix ii) is fully set 
forth in Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure wherein it 
states: 
". . . . Findings of fact, whether based upon oral 
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. . . .If 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Grayson Roper LTD. v. 
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, (Utah 1989), page 470; 
"... On the other hand, a trial court's 
findings of fact are given deferential 
review....To successfully attack a trial 
court's findings of fact, an appellant must 
first marshall all the evidence in support of 
the findings and then demonstrate that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
findings against an attack under the rule 52(a) 
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standard, [citations omitted]..." 
The standard as it relates to the theory of promissory 
estoppel is one of reasonableness and equity. (Chernick v. U.S., 
372 P.2d 492, (U.S. Ct.of Claims 1967; Tolboe Construction Company 
v. Staker Paving & Const., 682 P.2d 843, (Utah 1984). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (appendix 
i). The judgment and ruling of the trial court is set out in the 
appendix, (appendix iii). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
NATURE OF CASE 
This was a lawsuit concerning breach of contract claims 
asserted by both the plaintiff and defendant and an additional 
claim under the theory of promissory estoppel asserted by the 
defendant. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff sued defendant for the sum of $1,434.83 on an open 
account on a project known as the Ogden Tabernacle Job. Defendant 
counterclaimed against the plaintiff for an offset on the Ogden 
Tabernacle Job and brought a new claim against the plaintiff on a 
project known as the Weber State College Job for breach of contract 
and/or under the theory of promissory estoppel for the sum of 
$15,000.00 plus costs, interest and other relief. Plaintiff 
replied to the counterclaim of the defendant stating that defendant 
was entitled to no offset on the Ogden Tabernacle Job. On the 
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Weber State College Job plaintiff claimed that there was no breach 
of contract as no contract existed between the parties and that 
defendant could not recover under the theory of promissory estoppel 
as he acted unreasonably and imprudently when he used a mistaken 
and incorrect price quote given to the him by the plaintiff. 
Defendant was informed and knew of the mistake prior to him using 
the price quote in a bid he was preparing wherein he was seeking 
the contract for the Weber State College job. 
Plaintiff and defendant proceeded with discovery in this 
matter up to trial. Plaintiff motioned for continuances in this 
matter due to the failure of defendant to provide discovery, which 
motions were denied by the trial court. Trial was held in April, 
1990, for two days, before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, 
presiding without a jury. 
DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT 
On the Ogden Tabernacle Job, the trial court granted some of 
defendants offsets totaling $587.50 and awarded a judgment to the 
plaintiff for the remaining balance of it's claim in the sum of 
$826.13. Defendant states in his brief, for the first time, that 
this part of the judgment is not being appealed. Plaintiff now 
asks the court to reaffirm the trial courts ruling in this matter 
with regards to the Ogden Tabernacle Job. 
On the Weber State College Job the Court ruled that there was 
no cause of action on defendants counterclaims as there was no 
contract between the parties. There was no acceptance by defendant 
of the prices quoted to him by the plaintiff prior to the time the 
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plaintiff withdrew the price quotes. The trial court also ruled 
that the requirements of promissory estoppel were not met as 
defendant could not reasonably rely upon the prices given by the 
plaintiff once they were withdrawn by the plaintiff prior to the 
bid deadline. 
For the remaining sections of this brief the Weber State 
College Job will be referred to as only "the job", as the appeal 
concerns only that project and the actions relating thereto. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Defendant is a resident of Weber County, State of Utah and 
a duly licensed electrical contractor under the laws of the State 
of Utah and was doing business as Lewis Electric at all times 
relevant to the issues before the Court. (Amended Counterclaim #11, 
R. , T. Vol I, p.19). 
2. Plaintiff is a corporation authorized to do business 
within the State of Utah. (Amended Counterclaim #2, R. , Affidavit 
of Donald Wilhelm #8, R. , T.Vol II, p.30). 
3. In or about July, 1988 Defendant became aware of work to 
be performed at Weber State College , the job, and obtained plans 
and specifications relating to this project. (Depo. of Defendant, 
P.21, L 1-25; R. T. Vol I, p.54.). 
4. Defendant after review of the plans and specifications 
relating to the job prepared a list of supplies, materials, and 
anything else defendant assessed would be needed for the job. This 
is called a "take-off". (Depo of Defendant P.13,L.22, P.25,L.1-13.; 
R. ;T.Vol I, p.55; T. Vol II, p.13-14). 
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5. The job was to be bid before 10:00 a.m. on July 20, 1988 
at the bid depository located at approximately 12th Street and 500 
West in Ogden, Utah, approximately eleven blocks from the 
defendants office. (Appendix v.,T.Vol I, p. 55,58,85). 
6. Approximately one week prior to the bid deadline, 
plaintiff prepared and delivered to the defendant a "bill of 
materials". (T.Vol I, p.55-56) This is a list of the material that 
a supplier, here the plaintiff, believes will be needed for the 
job. It contains no prices. Based upon this bill of materials, the 
supplier, here the plaintiff, will give a price quote on the day 
the bid is due to the contractor, here the defendant. (Depo of 
Pusey, P.9-11, R. , Depo of Defendant P.25, L.4-24; R. ;T.Vol I, 
p.55; T. Vol II p.14-15). 
7. On July 20, 1988 defendant began preparing his bid to be 
submitted to the bid depository. (Appendix v.,T.Vol I, p.59) 
Defendant had to make one original bid and then make eleven copies 
to be submitted to 10 general contractors, one to the bid 
depository and one for his file. (T. Vol I,p.58). 
8. On July 20, 1988 defendant began telephoning the 
suppliers, including the plaintiff, to received price quotes from 
them as it related to the prepared bill of materials and the job. 
(T.Vol I,p.59). 
9. At approximately 9:30 a.m. on July 20, 1988 plaintiff 
quoted to the defendant the price of $213,400.00 for this job. (T. 
Vol II, p.19-20; T.Vol I,p.59,85). A different price was quoted 
to him by a second electrical supplier, Electrical Wholesale, for 
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this job at a total price 5.9% higher than the figure given by the 
plaintiff. (T.Vol I, p.87). No discussions about awarding the 
contract to the plaintiff were held at this time by the plaintiff 
nor the defendant, just an exchange of numbers. (T. Vol II,p.20) 
10. At approximately 9:50 a.m. on July 20, 1988 plaintiff 
called the defendant back, and speaking with Mr. Lewis personally, 
told him that the price quote given to him previously was incorrect 
and that the correct price was $222,400.00. Plaintiff told the 
defendant that it could not honor the lower price but would be 
willing to do the work at the higher price. (T.Vol I, p.85; T. Vol 
II, p.21-23,50-51) . Defendant denies the statement that the 
plaintiff was willing to do the work at the higher price. Again 
no discussions were held between the plaintiff and the defendant 
with regards to awarding the contract to the plaintiff. (T. Vol II, 
p.25) 
11. During the telephone call at 9:50 a.m. on July 20, 1988 
defendant informed plaintiff that it was too late to change the 
figures on the bid and he was going to submit the bid as he had 
prepared it using plaintiff's incorrect prices, even though 
defendant only had to change two numbers, make the copies at his 
office, with the help of two other people, and then drive to the 
bid depository. (T.Vol I, p.99-100) The other two people had 
drivers licenses and could have helped drive.(T.Vol I,p.86). 
Defendant then left his office, drove to the bid depository and 
deposited the bid, even though defendant knew of the mistake by the 
plaintiff. (T.Vol I, p.60,64). The bid was deposited at 9:59 a.m. 
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(T.Vol I, p.64). 
12. Defendant had many options once he became aware of the 
mistake by the plaintiff. He could have not submitted his bid, 
withdrawn his bid after deposit and at any time prior to the time 
the contract was awarded or he could have made corrections, by 
crossing out the numbers and submitting the corrected bid. (T. Vol 
II, p. 29). Defendant claims he could not withdraw his bid after 
deposit or make the corrections by crossing out prior to deposit. 
13. Plaintiff attempted to contact the defendant after the 
bid deadline to see if he was going to award the contract to the 
plaintiff and if so, when was plaintiff going to begin the job with 
the defendcint. (T. Vol II, p.21-22; T. Vol II, p. 44,46-48) . 
14. Defendant was awarded the contract on his bid as he was 
the low bidder by a 6% margin. (T.Vol I, p.66-67, 93-95). 
15. Defendant deposited the bid because he needed the job and 
he was hoping that he could get relief from the prices. (T.Vol I, 
p. 64). 
16. Defendant thereafter did not retain the plaintiff to 
supply the electrical material and plaintiff did not furnish any 
of the electrical material on the job. (T. Vol II, p.27). 
Defendant used two other electrical suppliers for the job, 
Whitehead Electric and Electrical Wholesale.(T.Vol I,p. 3,70,74). 
The total cost to the defendant at the time of trial was higher 
than the corrected price of the plaintiff. The job was not rebid 
by the defendant. (T. Vol I,p.88-94). 
17. As of the date of the trial the job was not complete. 
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(T. Vol I,p.53,70,103). 
18. There is no written contract between the parties. 
(Affidavit of Donald Wilhelm #10, R. , T. Vol II,p.91). 
19. On August 26, 1988, defendant mailed a letter to the 
plaintiff explaining his problems with Plaintiff, (appendix iv, 
T.Vol I,p.68-69). 
20. Defendant did not provide any evidence of the profit or 
loss it received at the completion of the job. Plaintiff objected 
to the evidence which was presented at trial by the defendant. The 
court reserved ruling upon plaintiff's objections and never did 
rule upon them. (T.Vol I, p.75-84). Defendant testified that it 
wanted fifteen percent profit on the job at trial due to the 
aggravation he suffered is going to court (T.Vol I,p.96) even 
though later he testified that the job was calculated for a five 
percent profit. (T.Vol I,p.96-98). 
21. Defendant performed under the awarded contract on the 
job. Defendant was paid in full on the job as well as his 
suppliers. (T.Vol I, p.104-106). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff argues that there was no contract between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. Further, that the theory of 
Promissory Estoppel does not apply in this case as defendant could 
not reasonable rely upon a mistake he knew existed to the detriment 
of the plaintiff and even if promissory estoppel applied, that the 
defendant failed to establish any damages or mitigate his damages. 
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The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court 
are correct and should be affirmed. 
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT 
A. There is no contract between the plaintiff and defendant. 
Judge Taylor held that in this matter there was no contract. 
It is basic contract law that a contract requires an offer, an 
acceptance and consideration. There was at least no acceptance 
in this matter and at most no acceptance and no consideration. 
Defendant received two price quotes on the day the bid was 
due. One of the price quote came from the plaintiff and the other 
came from another electrical supplier. There were no words of 
acceptance and no exchange of consideration. Defendant never did 
say that he would accept the prices of the plaintiff. (Depo. of 
Defendant, p.31,L.1-4). In fact the plaintiff contacted defendant 
after the bid deadline to see if they had a contract. 
If the court interprets the price quote of the plaintiff as 
an offer then the offer was withdrawn prior to acceptance by the 
defendant. The general rule is stated in 17 C.J.S., Contracts, 
Sec.50, page 707-708, states: 
"A subcontractor cannot withdraw from his 
agreement after the contractor has accepted the 
subcontractor's bid, although the principal 
contract has not yet been awarded. 
• 
Before acceptance. As a general rule, an 
offer, if not under seal or supported by a 
consideration, may be revoked or withdrawn at 
any time before it is accepted and the 
acceptance is communicated when communication 
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is necessary, for until then there is neither 
agreement or consideration.... if both parties 
meet, one prepared to accept and the other to 
retract, whichever speaks first will have the 
law with him; and this question is one of fact 
to be decided by the jury, [emphasis added].'1 
Clearly there is no contract between the parties and the judge, 
acting as the finder of fact found that the plaintiff acted first 
to withdraw his offer, that the defendant did not communicate his 
acceptance of the offer. 
If the Court determines that there is a valid contract between 
the parties then plaintiff has asserted defenses which should bar 
the enforcement of the contract. 
The first defense was the one of mitigation of damages. After 
the plaintiff was not allowed to perform under the contract at 
either price the defendant did not rebid the job, but went with the 
prices he had been given by the other electrical supplier, 
Electrical Wholesale, on the day the bid was due. He also bought 
other items from a second supplier, also without biding. The price 
quote from Electrical Wholesale was greater than even the higher 
price quote of the plaintiff by approximately $3,600.00 (T. Vol I, 
p. 88-93) and the combined price from both suppliers used by the 
defendant to do the work was, based upon the allegations of the 
defendant, greater than the higher price of the plaintiff by at 
least $15,000.00. The defendant did not ask the State for any 
claims review or any other relief from the contract. 
The second defense asserted was waiver and estoppel. 
The actions of the defendant set forth in the facts section, infra, 
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and the statements in the argument relating to promissory estoppel, 
supra, could clearly allow the court to determine that the 
defendant waived his rights to any claims under the contract and 
he is estopped from seeking enforcement of the contract. 
B. Defendant is not entitled to 
recover from the plaintiff under the 
theory of promissory estoppel. 
Since there is no contract between the parties, defendant is 
asking the court to imply one under the theory of promissory 
estoppel. The Utah Supreme Court has been very active concerning 
this theory of recovery. 
In Tolboe Const, v. Staker Paving & Const., 682 P.2d 843, 
(Utah, 1984), a contractor commenced an action to recover damages 
from a subcontractor for the subcontractor refusing to perform 
paving work according to a bid submitted to the contractor. The 
Utah Supreme Court ruled in favor of the subcontractor and in 
ruling clearly stated what is required for a recovery under 
promissory estoppel. They declared at page 845-846: 
"[Promissory estoppel] is a doctrine of equity 
which the [defendant] could claim the benefit 
of only by showing the facts required to 
justify its application. These would include 
that the [plaintiff was] aware of all the 
material facts; that in such awareness they 
made the promise when they knew that the 
[defendant] was acting in reliance on it; that 
the latter, observing reasonable care and 
prudence, acted in reliance on the promise and 
got into a position where it suffered a loss. 
Under such circumstances, equity recognizes the 
unfairness of permitting withdrawal of the 
promise and will enforce it. [emphasis added. ]" 
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The Supreme Court continued latter on by saying: 
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 [K]knowledge by one party that the other is 
acting under mistake is treated as equivalent 
to mutual mistake for purpose of rescission. 
[Citations omitted. ] Relief from mistaken bids 
is consistently allowed when one party knows 
or has reason to know of the other's error and 
the requirements for rescission are fulfilled. 
[Emphasis added.]" 
Also, in Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Brothers, 387 P.2d 1000, (Utah 
1964) the Utah Supreme Court refused to apply the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel to enforce a mistaken subcontractors bid 
because the contractor knew or should have know of the mistake by 
the subcontractor. 
Defendant did not "observe reasonable care and prudence11 in 
acting upon the alleged promise of the plaintiff. 
Defendant was told personally prior to the bid deadline that 
the prices quoted by the plaintiff were incorrect. Defendant was 
given a new price for the material. Defendant chose to ignore the 
new prices and take his chances with the mistaken prices. He was 
told that plaintiff would not do the work for the lower price. 
Defendant submitted his bid in the hope that he would get the job 
and then be able to get the material for the lower price because 
he needed the work. 
Defendant could have attempted to change the figures on the 
bid he intended to deposit with the bid depository. The mistake 
by the plaintiff was a $9,000.00 error which could easily be 
recalculated, including the new taxes and overhead. If the 
defendant was worried about the taxes and overhead, (which should 
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not have changed from the first calculation) then he could have 
just added $10,000.00 to the bid and counted the rest as profit. 
He would have had to change at most two numbers on the bid form, 
(appendix v), made eleven copies and then he and his employees who 
were there helping him, could have driven to the bid depository, 
one driving and the other placing the new bid in the prepared 
envelopes to be deposited. Defendant could have made the 
corrections on the original bid form. He did not have to make out 
a new bid form. 
There is also testimony that the defendant could have 
withdrawn his bid prior to the acceptance by the General Contractor 
without any liability. Defendant decided not to do this in hopes 
of doing the work. 
The actions of the defendant were not reasonable or prudent 
under the circumstances. He took a risk, knowing of the mistake, 
and the risk did not pay and now he is asking the court to charge 
the risk to the plaintiff. There was no detrimental reliance on 
the part of the defendant. 
If the Court feels that a contract should be implied, then 
plaintiff asserts that it's enforcement should be barred due to the 
defenses raised by the plaintiff, which are failure of defendant 
to mitigate his damages and the actions of the defendant are enough 
to establish a waiver and estoppel as explained infra. 
The defendant relies upon the case of Gerson Electric Const. 
Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 726, (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1983). 
This case is distinguishable from the present case. In Gerson, a 
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electrical contractor brought an action against an electrical 
subcontractor supplier for lost profits allegedly caused by the 
subcontractor supplier's refusal to perform pursuant to it's 
submitted bid that resulted in the contractor being forced to 
withdraw its low bid after it was awarded the contract. The 
contractor stated that it was impossible to substitute another 
subcontractor once the time for submitting his bid had lapsed. The 
contractor and the subcontractor had met together prior to the time 
the bids were due to design a proposed system for the project, as 
it was a specialized project. The subcontractor then gave a price 
to the contractor for the project, which the contractor used and 
incorporated into his bid which was submitted. The contractor was 
awarded the contract and subsequent to the award of the contract, 
the subcontractor refused to perform unless it was for a higher 
price. The subcontractor did not claim any mistake was made on the 
first price quote. The contractor was then allowed to withdraw his 
bid and sue for loss profits due to the fact it could not perform 
the contract due to the specialized design of the system by the 
subcontractor and the fact that it could not replace the 
subcontractor on this job. The court held that the contractor 
could recover under a theory of promissory estoppel as it is 
defined in Illinois for lost profits. 
This is different from the case at bar by the following facts: 
In Gerson the subcontract was a specialized one, not a contract 
concerning common items; in Gerson the subcontractor submitted his 
price and the contractor submitted his bid and only after the 
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contract was awarded did the subcontractor refuse to perform, in 
the case at hand the subcontractor informed the contractor of the 
mistake prior to the contractor submitting his bid; in Gerson the 
subcontractor did not allege any mistake unlike the present case; 
and there were other subcontractors that could have done the work 
in the present case unlike the Gerson case. Further the 
contractor, according to the Illinois Appellate court held that he 
did all that he could to mitigate his damages which is not the case 
between the plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant did not 
mitigate his damages. The Court in Illinois also applied it's 
interpretation of the theory of promissory estoppel as developed 
in Illinois, not the one defined by numerous Utah Court decision. 
This case is not controlling and should not be used as a precedent. 
The defendant also uses the case of John Price Associates, 
Inc. v. Warner Elec. Inc., 723 F.2d 755 (U.S. Ct. of App., 10 Cir., 
1983) to support itfs claims. This is a case where the 
subcontractor attempted to withdraw its bid after the contract was 
awarded and after the contractor had given notice to the 
subcontractor that it Tms going to rely upon the prices of the 
subcontractor. The contractor also did not know of any alleged 
mistake by the subcontractor prior to the time it submitted its 
bid. The contractor also did act reasonably according to the court 
to mitigate it's damages. This is clearly not the same facts as 
the present matter. The defendant had actual knowledge of the 
mistake and the bid was withdrawn prior to the time the contractor 
was going to submit his bid. No notice was given to the plaintiff 
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that the defendant was going to rely upon the price quote of the 
plaintiff. Defendant did not mitigate his damages. 
Plaintiff questions whether the defendant suffered any loss 
due to the actions of the plaintiff as alleged by the defendant. 
The theory of promissory estoppel requires that defendant suffer 
a loss. Defendant has stated that all the suppliers to the job 
used by him have been paid and that he was paid in full. He does 
claim that he has loss some profits, which even at trial were 
calculated at a different rate than on the bid or during discovery. 
(T. Vol I, p.96-98). At the time of trial the job was not finished 
and there could be no manner in which the lost profits could be 
calculated with certainty. Even if the defendant had taken the 
higher price of the plaintiff the defendant would have been the low 
bidder on the job, be awarded the contract, and had to spend less 
money to complete the job. 
C. Defendant did not carry his burden of proof. 
Defendant failed to carry it's burden of proof as to damages. 
Plaintiff requested from the defendant invoices on the job in order 
to determine what, if any damages, the defendant may have suffered 
due to the actions of the plaintiff. This was requested during the 
discovery period of the pending lawsuit and at the pretrial. At 
the time of trial, plaintiff still had not received all of the 
invoices requested. This was due to the fact that the job was not 
totally completed and some alleged problems with the mail. The 
prayer in the counterclaim asks for $15,000.00; at trial, the 
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defendant ask for $15,221.50 plus interest, loss profits, and 
costs, now on appeal defendant is asking for $15,221.50 as over 
charges and lost profits of about $23,261.00. Defendant does not 
even know what the damages are, if any, in this matter. The 
profits were calculated at different rates at different times 
during this proceeding as mentioned above. Plaintiff motioned the 
court to continue the trial until the job was completed, which was 
denied. Plaintiff then objected to the invoices being presented 
at trial as they were not provided to the plaintiff according to 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and previous orders 
of the Court. This objection was reserved, but not ruled upon by 
the court. (T. Vol I, p. 75-84). 
D. The Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law are correct. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law given by the court 
are not erroneous and should not be disturbed pursuant to the 
standard found in Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Conclusions of Laws are found in the appendix (appendix 
ii). 
CONCLUSION 
The rulings of the trial court should not be disturbed and 
the judgment should be affirmed. There was no contract between the 
parties and no contract should be implied by the theory of 
promissory estoppel due to the unreasonable and imprudent acts of 
the defendant. Defendant has repeatedly failed to show any loss 
18 
or damage. As stated in Guardian State Bank v. Stanql, 778 P.2d 
1 (Utah 1989) by the Utah Supreme Court, " a mistake . . . may not 
be exploited by one party to take advantage of the other." 
Defendant should not be entitled to take advantage of the mistake 
of the plaintiff. Plaintiff should be entitled to recover it's 
costs in this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of June, 1991, 
Jones 
Atjtorhiy for P l a i n t i f f / 
R€(jspomalent 
Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State, Suite 2650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of plaintiff/respondents 
brief, postage prepaid, by U.S. Mail this 14th day of June, 1991 
to the attorney for the defendant/appellant, La Var Stark at 2485 
Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
lyle W./Jones 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Respofoaent 
Benetfacial Life Tower 
36 South State, Suite 2650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. 
—Breach of contract. 
—Child custody. 
—Contempt. 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. 
—Divorce decree modifications. 
—Easement. 
—Evidentiary disputes. 
—Juvenile action. 
—Material issues. 
Harmless error. 
—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
—Water dispute. 
Findings of state engineer. 
Amendment. 
—Motion. 
Conformance with original findings. 
New trial. 
Notice of appeal. 
Time. 
Tolling of appeal period. 
When made. 
—Overruling or vacation. 
Another district judge. 
Lack of notice. 
Child custody awards. 
Criminal cases. 
Effect. 
—Preclusion of summary judgment. 
—Relation to pleadings. 
Failure to object to findings. 
How findings entered. 
Judicial review. 
—Standard of review. 
Conclusions of law. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal trials. 
Findings of facta by jury. 
Juvenile proceedings. 
Purpose of rule. 
Stipulations. 
Sufficiency. 
—Allegations of pleadings. 
—Burden on appeal. 
—Found insufficient. 
Vacation of judgment. 
—Found sufficient. 
—Opinion or memorandum of decision. 
—Recitals of procedures. 
—Technical error. 
Kyle W. Jones 1744 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street, Suite 2650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-7771 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GRAYBAR ELECTRIC COMPANY INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
JAMES LEWIS dba LEWIS 
ELECTRIC, 
Defendant, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 890903456 
Judge: Stanton M. Taylor 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
trial in the above-entitled court, before the Honorable Judge 
Stanton M. Taylor, on Tuesday, April 24, 1990 and Wednesday, 
April 25, 1990 at the hours of 1:30 p.m. and 9:30 a.m. 
respectively. Kyle W. Jones appeared for and on behalf of the 
Plaintiff and LaVar Stark appeared for and on behalf of the 
defendant. Plaintiff was also present by its representatives 
and the defendant was present. 
The courts records and file in this matter, and the 
sworn testimony of the parties and witnesses having been duly 
considered and good cause appearing therefore, the Court now 
makes and enteres the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a corporation authorized to do business 
in the State of Utah. 
2. Defendant is a resident of Weber County, State of 
Utah and is doing business in Weber County as Lewis Electric. 
3. Defendant owed to the Plaintiff the sum of $1,413.63 
under a contract between them concerning a project that concerned 
the Ogdea Tabernacle located in Weber County. 
4. Defendant suffered substantial delays on the 
Ogden Tabernacle project and that Defendant was damaged by 
reason of those delays. 
5. Defendant was responsible to field cut and trim 
as needed , all materials furnished under the Norton Ceiling 
plans on the Ogden Tabernacle project. 
6. Defendant signed a document agreeing to field 
cut and trim all materials from Norton Ceilings and those 
plans became an integral part of the contract. Defendant was 
under no obligation to accept this condition but choose to 
accept the condition. 
7. Defendant is not entitled to claim as an offset of 
any of the expenses that relate to the cutting and trimming 
of the Norton Ceiling grid. 
8. Defendant is entitled to only an offset on the 
Ogden Tabernacle project in the amount of $587.50. Defendant 
is not entitled to recover anything additional as claimed 
in the pleadings on the Ogden Tabernacle project. 
9. Defendant owes to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$826.13 on the Ogden Tablernacle project. 
10. There was no contract between the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant concerning the dealings between them on the Weber 
State College project. There was no offer and no acceptance 
of the prices on the Weber State College project. 
11. If there was an offer by the Plaintiff in this 
matter then the Plaintiff had the right to withdraw its 
offer any time prior to acceptance, and this is what the 
plaintiff attempted to do prior to the bid deadline of 10:00 
a.m. on the morning of the date the bid from defendant was due. 
12. Defendant knew the figure received from the 
plaintiff concerning the prices for supplies in the Weber State 
College project were wrong but he choose to submit them 
anyway in his bid. 
13. Defendant was personally aware of the wrong 
prices. 
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14. Defendant submitted his bid, with the wrong 
prices, based upon the hope that he would be able to get the 
material for the lower price. 
15. Defendant did not reasonable rely upon the wrong 
prices given to him by the Plaintiff. Defendant could not 
rely upon the first^praybor figure of $213,400 when he knew it 
was a wrong figure. 
16. Defendant has suffered no detrimental reliance 
due to the actions of the plaintiff concerning the Weber State 
College project. 
From the forgoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff is entitled to Judgment on its 
complaint in the sum of $826.13. This is based upon the fact 
that defendant owed to the plaintiff the sum of $1,413.63 on 
an open account but due to the actions of the plaintiff, is 
entitled to an offset to this sum in the amount of $587.50. 
2. That defendant is entitled to an offset, 
under the claims set forth in its second cause of action stated 
it's counterclaim and under it's affirmative defense stated 
in it's answer, to Plaintiff's open account claims in the amount 
of $587.50. 
3. That the Court finds no cause of action under 
defendants First Cause of Action found in it's Counterclaim, 
concerning the Weber State College Project. There was no 
contract between the parties and since defendant had 
no detrimental reliance and could not reasonable rely upon the 
mistaken price figure given to him, but later changed prior to 
the bid deadline of the defendant, that there is not a 
promissory estoppel claim in this matter. 
4. Each party will bear their own costs in this 
matter. 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
THE COURT: Well, starting with the 
complaint, I think everyone agreed that the amounts paid 
under the contract were not paid under the contract. 
Let's see. That figure was $1,413.63. Since that was the 
agreement of the parties the Court finds in fact that was 
the amount that was not paid under the — under the 
contract. 
Concerning the counterclaims — there are two basic 
counterclaims — I'm going to take them in reverse order. 
The second counterclaim relating to the Weber State 
College job, you know, I have some kind of bad feelings 
about it. I frankly have a lot of sympathy for Mr. Lewis' 
position on it, but I think from the standpoint of the 
law, Graybar's going to prevail. 
I think there is a distinction between what's moral 
and what's legal, and it seems to me that if somebody 
calls up and says, we'll do it for a certain price, that 
they should — they should do it for a certain price. 
From the standpoint of the law, there is no — there 
is obviously no contract because a contract requires offer 
and acceptance and there's no offer, or there's no 
acceptance. A bid is in the nature of an offer, and 
there's actually no acceptance of that offer until 
after — after the contract is accepted by the general or 
the general receives the bid and then accepts the 
-2-
iii 
1 subcontract and so on. 
2
 And under the law of contracts, any time a party to a 
3 
4 
7 
11 
contract wants to withdraw, they have a right to withdraw 
an offer any time prior to acceptance. That's — I think 
5
 that's where the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel comes 
6
 J into play because of situations like this. It's not the 
classic offer/acceptance situation. 
8
 I Under Promissory Estoppel if somebody submits a bid 
9
 relying upon that bid, the Court's going to come along 
10 I later and say, well, we're — we're going to estop the — 
the subcontractor from denying the fact that they have — 
12 I that they have made a bid at a particular figure and that 
13 the contractor relied upon that bid. 
14 J The thing that's lacking in this case, of course, is 
the reliance. When — when Graybar contacted Mr. Lewis 
and indicated to him that it was a mistake and that they 
17 | could not go with the lower bid, when he submitted his bid 
18
 1 then he wasn't relying upon that — there wasn't the 
19 I detrimental reliance that would be normally required in a 
20 Promissory Estoppel situation. 
21 J He submitted his bid based upon a hope that he would 
be able to — to get the material for the lower price, but 
23 I in this case it appears to be a vain hope. So Promissory 
24 J Estoppel will fail based on the fact that there wasn't a 
reliance upon the Graybar figure, that's the $213,400. So 
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15 
16 
22 
25 
1
 I the Court reluctantly finds no cause on the second action 
2 
3 
4 
or the second cause of action. 
On the first cause, the Court finds that there was 
substantial delays, and that Mr. Lewis was damaged by 
reason of those delays. But once again, the Court is 
bound by the — the documents that have been submitted and 
the — the primary document that — that damages 
Mr. Lewis7 claim is the document from Norton containing 
the plans, which was signed by Mr. Lewis, wherein it was 
stated, all materials furnished in standard length sizes 
to be field cut and trimmed as needed by contractor. 
I think that becomes an integral part of the 
contract. And I recognize the concern that Mr. Lewis had 
about that, the fact that he had to get the materials and 
had to get started on it, but I guess he didn't have to 
accept that as a condition if he chose not to. 
Therefore, the offset does not include any of the 
expenses that relate to the — the cutting and trimming 
and so forth of the — of the grid. The Court has gone 
through the exhibits and believes that if I exclude those 
21
 | amounts that the offset that Mr. Lewis will be entitled to 
would amount to $587.50. 
So the Court is going to allow an offset to that 
extent against the $1,413.63. And where each party has to 
some extent prevailed and to some extent failed, the Court 
- 4 -
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
6 
7 
8 
will order 
Have I 
that both part ies bear there 
neglected anything? 
MR. JONES: 
question then. The $587. 
$1,413.63? 
THE COURT: 
If I 
50 is 
That' 
can just 
own 
ask 
costs. 
one quick 
just an offset to the 
rs right. 
differenced 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. JONES: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Court's in recess. 
MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(WHEREUPON, at this time proceedings concluded.) 
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oLewid Electric L^ompany. 
ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS 
August 26, 1988 
~£ EXHIBIT 
DATE ^ - ^ O 
WITNESS lx^S<3 
CARIIEE9USTIN, RPR/NOTARY 
B11 I Kuykendal I 
Branch Manager 
Graybar E l e c t r i c Supply, Inc . 
2841 South 900 West 
P.O. Box 25718 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125 
Re: Weber State Col lege, Physical Education Facility. 
Dear Bill, 
1 would like written confirmation of the telephoee call Kerry 
Pusey made to me the other day regarding this project. Also a 
clearer understanding of your reasons. 
The job was to be bid at 10:00 A.M. Earlier, and In time to use 
your price I received a price of $213,400.00. At approximately seven 
minutes to ten, I received another 'call when he said they had made a 
mistake and the price should be $222,400.00. 
I told him it was too late for me to open all the bids, change 
the prices, and make it in time to the bid depository. 
When it appeared that I was the low bidder, I received at least 
six calls from him the first week asking v/hen he was going to get an 
order. That he needed to know so that he could go back to the suppliers 
and get some relief. I told him 1 did not have a contract and couldn't 
give him an order until I did. 
This week he was in again asking for the order. I told him to go 
ahea^. The next day he called and said you wouldn't let him take the 
order because the price was too low. He said nothing about even honor-
ing his higher price. 
When he called I had several other people in my office and was 
unable to discuss it with him. Since then I have not been able to contact 
Another thing I would like resolved h-*« the ccei di due me for a 
starter coil 1 had to return because he shipped the wrong voltage and I 
had to replace it. This was true of several of them. Before he got me 
credit for the others I got two letters from your credit manager. Each 
time, and several times, Kerry promised he would get it cleared up. I 
did not realize your Credit department had been moved to Las Vegas, so 
I couldn't understand why Kerry couldn't walk over to Skip's desk and 
get it straightened out. The account has been "past due" because of this 
for some months. Is this one of the reasons for your actions ? 
Kerry still owes me credit for one starter coil f 
Please give me a better understanding of your actions. In this 
business I need my suppliers as much as you need me and 1 need my 
customers. But if we cannot rely on each other's word, it leaves a 
miserable way to do business. 
The last time I saw Kerry he said he wanted to work with me on 
bidding Hill Field jobs. Is that st i l*K tru^_ or isthat tabyo also ? 
Why or why not ? \ 7 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 r^->w 
cc: Kerry^usey^ ^
 O Q D £ ^ ^ ^ h ^ ^ ^ O t < E (801) 393-0942 
1/4 J W£bf ALL,\.V«JLJ* bi~r^x bo l iE 101 
SALT LAKE CITY, ITEAH 84119 975-0295 
PROJECT: 
DATE: 
PLACE: 
TO: 
ADDRESS: 
PHYSICAL EDUCATION FACILITY W.S.C 
JULY 20, 1988 3:00 PM 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
!<£*-
BID SERVICE JOB NO:88-43 
DEPOSITORY CLOSING: 
JULY 20, 1988 10:00 AM 
ADDRESS: 
ADDENDUMSJ are acknowledged. 
FOLD HERE - This-side to shew through window envelope. 
\*fe prcpose to furnish, in accordance with Bid Service Rules and Procedures 
all labor, materials, equiprent and applicable taxes necessary to ccrnplete 
the Electrical Installation on the above project, as shewn on the drawings 
and described in the specifications and written addeixhr^s, as follows: 
GENERAL AND Sl?PUE*ENTAL CONDITIONS: as applicable to: 
DIVISION 16 ELECTRICAL 
SECTIONS: 16001 Electrical General Provisions 16183 
16070 Electrical Connections for Equipment 16184 
16110 Conduit Raceways " " 16420 
16120 Conductors and"Cables 16452 
16135 Electrical Bcxes and Fittings 16510 
16136 Supporting Devices 
16140 Wiring Devices 1§551 
16145 Busduct 16510 
16155 Motor Starters 16721 
16160 Panelboards 16740 
1617" Motor Circuit and Disconnects 16750 
16180 Overcurrant Protective Devices 16782 
16181 Transformers 
16182 Switchgear and Switchboards 16786 
16111 
Motor Control Centers 
Pcwer Factor Correction 
Service Entrance 
Grounding 
Interior and Exterior Buil' 
Lighting 
Exter ior Area Lighting 
Emergency E lec t r i ca l Syster 
Fire Alarm & Detection Sys 
Telephone System (Raceways 
Sound Systeri 
Gym Exterior Door Security. 
S y s t ^ 
Clock & Program 
Raceway Systen 
R\SE BID: ; VSl. <t '9 ? 
ALTEKiATE NO:, 3 Parking Ground Upgrade 
l^OTE: Concrete Light Pole Bases are included in car 3ase bid as per Section 16551 
NOTE: We respectfully point out provisions of the General Conditions relative to 
paynent and retention will be expected in aur behalf. 
PLEASE SEE OTHER SIDE 
EXHIBIT J L 
DATE _ ^ 
WITNESS 
) - X 11 
LCI.~>I > 
CARiLEE DUSTIN, RPR/NOTARY 
llilS BID DOES NOT DELUDE: 
Bond Premium 
Prorated Cost of Utilities for Construction Purposes 
Temporary Light and Pouer Facilities 
My Bondang Capicity is adequate for this project. YES X NO 
Tor Bond Verification call J ? X O J7 T Cost of Bond / J~^>2* 
Utah Contractors License Nur»ber C^JT * & ^H/ 
DATE SIGNED ") v >-» - *% f COMPANY 
By Execution of this bid form, I certify U.nt I have reid the Rules and Procedures 
ao;erninq the operation of the ^ tah Sib Contractors Bid Service as revised by Board 
Action May 1987 and all anrndnents thereto, and agree that I will abide by those Pule 
and Procedures. 
r
rLPm*E N rSEP J fy * 6 j y *— SI(?CD 3Y^ 
gtCftPTloM : p0t,, /^#r ,«u(cUc jc/'iy «'*«*, 
f 
/ / - ^ / r ^ 
.iwi± SlLclxic Company 
ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS 
1597 South 1200 West 
P O Box 2006 
Ogden Utah &4404 
(801) 393-0941 
JOB ESTIMATE 
f EXHIBIT c ^ L DATF 2- fr- <?i> 
WITNESS L C ^ : ^ 
CARILEE DUSTIN, RPR/NQTARY 
E S T I M A T E -
SHEET *r 
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QUANTITY 
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MATERIAL 
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